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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION -EXECUTIVE SPEECHES
BANNING LUNCH COUNTER SIT-INS HELD To BE STATE ACTION
IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Lombard v. Louisiana (U.S. 1963)
Petitioners, one white and three Negro college students, entered a
Five and Ten Cent Store in New Orleans, Louisiana, sat down at a
refreshment counter customarily reserved for whites, requested service and
were refused. The restaurant manager asked petitioners to leave. When
they did not, he closed the counter and called the police. Petitioners still
declined to leave after the police arrived as a result of which they were
arrested. One week prior to this incident, after a similar "sit-in" demon-
stration, both the Chief of Police and the Mayor of New Orleans had
issued statements condemning such conduct and stating that the Police
Department was prepared to act against "any person or group who disturbs
the peace or creates disorder on public or private property."1 Unlike other
"sit-in" cases, however, there was in this instance "no state statute or city
ordinance forbidding desegregation of the races in all restaurant facilities." 2
The Supreme Court of Louisiana3 affirmed the conviction by the trial
court, holding that the action of the store manager in refusing the petitioners
service was in accordance with a policy established by the manager for the
past several years and was not action by the state as contemplated by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, through Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, reversed, holding that the official command of a city police chief
directing continuance of segregated service in private restaurants and pro-
hibiting any conduct by either white or Negro towards its discontinuance,
is state action as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Lombard
v. Louisiana, ......... U.S ........... 83 S.Ct. 1122 (1963).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." In the Civil Rights Cases4 the Supreme Court clearly stated
that this amendment placed no restrictions on the acts of a private
individual. The defendants there had denied Negroes access to theatres
and inns solely because of their race. The Court held the Civil Rights Act
1. Lombard v. Louisiana, 83 S.Ct. 1122, 1123 n.2 (1963).
2. 83 S.Ct. at 1122.
3. State v. Goldfinch, 241 La. 958, 132 So. 2d 860 (1961).
4. 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
(129)
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of 1875,5 which made it a federal crime for the owner of public conveyances,
theatres, and other places of public amusement to deny anyone the full
and equal enjoyment of their accommodations, to be beyond the constitu-
tional authority granted Congress by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The doctrine of "state action" evolved from this landmark case.
The fundamental right to equality of opportunity in acquiring property of
every kind was said to be free only from "state" interference and not from
"private" discriminatory practices.
However, until Shelley v. KraemerO in 1948, it was generally believed
that judicial enforcement of private discrimination did not constitute state
action.7 In Shelley, the Supreme Court held that the enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant by a state court was a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court wrote as
though all enforcements of private discrimination were state action, and
all such state action denied equal protection. Carried to its most extreme
point this doctrine indicates that there is state action whenever a will is
probated or the state enforces a judgment in trespass. If this reasoning
were to be followed, the instant case would hardly be worth noting, for it
would certainly be judicial enforcement of a private discrimination. How-
ever, restrictive covenant cases differ from the social trespass and testa-
mentary devise cases in that they present a different balance of our con-
stitutional rights of liberty and equality as defined in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
When the issue of discrimination affects one of these areas (restrictive
covenant, social trespass or testamentary devise), the state cannot escape
involvement. It must decide whether to encourage or discourage, to permit
or outlaw, such discrimination. Moreover, the state's choice is limited by
the Fourteenth Amendment which not only forbids the state from denying
equality to the discriminated, but also forbids the state to deprive the dis-
criminator of property and of liberty "without due process of law." Although
these are conflicting rights, they are by no means equal.
"Sophistication and 'realism' have long taught that there is no escape
from-or anodyne for-the pains of judgment, of drawing lines, of weighing,
balancing, distinguishing and dividing."8 Herein lies the task of the Su-
preme Court in the "sit-in" cases, for it would be an impossible task to
fashion and apply a precise formula to tell "whether the character of the
State's involvement in an arbitrary discrimination is such that it should
be held responsible for the discrimination."9
5. 18 Stat. 336 (1875).
6. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
7. See, e.g., Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596(1920); Queensborough Land Co. v. Cayeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915). But
see Grandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892).
8. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
Rgv. 473, 505 (1962).
9. Lombard v. Louisiana, 83 S.Ct. 1122, 1133 (1963). (Harlan, J., dissenting.)
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Realizing the extreme of Shelley, the Court has withheld expanding
this line of logic beyond racially-restrictive covenants. 10 It is not prohibited
state action for a court to enforce discriminatory provisions of a will.1'
Where a testamentary trust established a private school for white male
orphans, a private trustee has a right to refuse Negro applicants on the
grounds that only white males were qualified for admission under the
terms of the trust.12
However, in "social" trespass cases the Court has found (without
relying on the logic of judicial enforcement expounded in Shelley) state
action in many varying and unique ways, the latest of which is the present
case. The decisions favoring Negro claims have relied on a variety of formal
state connections to impose standards of equal protection on private bus-
inesses. The state is responsible when it permits "a corporation to govern
a community of citizens."13 The state which owns and leases property to
a private body is responsible for the conduct of its lessee, when the property
is owned and leased in the manner used in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Autlhority.14
The Supreme Court neatly avoided state action considerations in
deciding the first "sit-in" case.' 5 There the Court held that a passenger on
an interstate trip has a federal right to be served without discrimination by
a restaurant. Again, in Garner v. Louisiana,1 6 the Court avoided a decision
based on the concept of state responsibility by holding there was not
sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners; while in Peterson v. City of
Greenville," the companion case to Lombard, the Court held that the
presence of a statute requiring segregation in restaurant facilities created
state action no matter how voluntary the private discrimination.
In the present case, there was no legislative action to enforce dis-
crimination. However, the Court found state action in the speeches by
the executive branch of the city government. The Court treated the two
speeches exactly as if there had been an ordinance prohibiting such conduct.
Thus, under the Peterson reasoning, no matter how voluntary the private
discrimination, state action is present. These speeches must be interpreted
in the light of "sit-ins" during this period.' 8  This is a time of social
10. Barrow's v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953). The Court expanded
Shelley by finding state action in the awarding of damages for breach of a racially
restrictive covenant.
11. See Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 226 (1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 947, 75 S.Ct. 875 (1955).
12. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958), cert.
denied, Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570, 78 S.Ct.
1383 (1958).
13. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509, 66 S.Ct. 276, 280 (1946).
14. 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961). The state was held responsible for allow-
ing discrimination which, as lessor, it could have prevented, in a restaurant privately
operated for personal profit, which was leased fr9m a public authority, and was part
of a complex of parking and other facilities built by the state on public land partly
with public funds.
15. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 81 S.Ct. 182 (1960).
16. 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248 (1961).
17. 83 S.Ct. 1119 (1963).
18. Pollit, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First
Sixty Days, 1960 DuKp L.J. 315.
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unrest in the South, where "sit-ins" have resulted in violence. 19 Such
speeches do tend to promote discrimination in the distant future; however,
in the immediate future they promote peace. Justice Harlan in his dis-
senting opinion points out that the two speeches "are more properly read
as an effort by these two officials to preserve the peace in what they might
reasonably have regarded as highly charged atmosphere. '20 Thus, once
again, the majority of the Supreme Court has avoided the issue of whether
it is a violation of the equal protection clause for a private restaurant
owner to refuse service to customers because of their race.
Congress is now considering President Kennedy's proposed civil rights
bill to outlaw racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. The
bill would ban racial discrimination by business establishments catering to
the public which are part of the interstate chain and serve, for the most part,
interstate travelers. Recognizing that Congress is in the process of acting
in this area, the Court may continue to avoid making so major a constitu-
tional decision. However, the Court must eventually grapple with the
heart of the matter for the proposed bill deals only with the Commerce
Clause, leaving the balance between liberty and equality to the Court. In
view of the fact that Congress realizes the change in our society and is
working on legislation, it seems that the nation is ready for a new balance
between liberty and equality.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion has attempted to meet
the issue that the majority has avoided. Having failed to persuade the
Court to accept his theory that the custom of the state to segregate Negroes
from whites is state action,21 he has strengthened his previous argument
that restaurants are a public accommodation. Due to the change in our
times, the Louisiana courts, by enforcing such criminal statutes, "are denying
some people access to the mainstream of our highly interdependent life
solely because of their race."'2 2 Douglas then argues that such judicial
enforcement is in violation of the principles of Shelley v. Kraemer2s and
Barrows v. Jackson.24 Moreover, he maintains that state licensing and sur-
veillance of such businesses becomes a service to the public rather than a
mere income-producing licensing requirement. Therefore, no state can
endow such a restaurant "with the authority to manage that business on
the basis of apartheid which is foreign to our Constitution.
25
19. Id. at 323-37.
20. Lombard v. Louisiana, 83 S.Ct. 1122, 1136 (1963). (Harlan, J., dissenting.)
21. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181, 82 S.Ct. 248, 261 (1961). Mr. Justice
Douglas concluded that customs may comprise state action. It is then argued that
state enforcement of a "custom of segregation" is invalid state action. This suggests
that the state may be responsible when it enforces segregation in Louisiana, but not
in Pennsylvania.
22. Lombard v. Louisiana, 83 S.Ct. 1122, 1128 (1963). (Douglas, J., concurring.)
23. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
24. 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
25. Lombard v. Louisiana, 83 S.Ct. 1122, 1130 (1963). (Douglas, J., concurring.)
[VOL. 9
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The restaurateur, for his advantage, has opened his property to the
public in general, and his rights have become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of the public in general. Ownership under these
circumstances no longer means absolute dominion. Thus, Douglas' reason-
ing appears to be the logical step for the Court to advance in the future.
This step must be taken with limits. State licensing is certainly not suffi-
cient state control from which to find state action, for nearly all businesses
require some type of state license. State licensing must be coupled with
state surveillance of the business for the benefit not only of the public,
but also of the owner. Similarly, the business must also be only "nominally"
private, thus giving the state an interest in its service so that the mainstream
of life may go on, free of discrimination.
Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissents to both the Peterson and Lombard
cases sees the issue as falling between liberty and equality, but he objects to
the Court's refusal to consider whether the discrimination by the restaur-
ateur was in fact voluntary. In so doing, Harlan has missed the entire
thrust of the state action concept. The logic of judicial enforcement ex-
pounded in Shelley shows that the state cannot escape involvement.
Placing this logic in the light of our present "mass society" 26 demonstrates
that the state must draw the balance between liberty and equality. It is
this balance that the Supreme Court must review.
The balance may be struck differently at different times, reflecting
differences in prevailing philosophy. Moreover, the continuing movement
from a laissez-faire to a welfare state has caused a reappraisal of this
balance. The need for equality has presently become more evident than it
was in the laissez-faire era.
Liberty and property rights are deeply rooted in the common law and
are fundamental to individual autonomy and privacy. There is a point
where the state must protect the liberty of the discriminator. The state
is involved in every discrimination. When it chooses to enforce or reject,
encourage or discourage discrimination, it must balance liberty and
equality. It is this balance that the Supreme Court must review. Thus it
is the state courts that must initially decide whether the liberty of the
discriminator will give way to the need for equality of the discriminated or,
if the balance should be struck in favor of the discriminator. In either
case the task of the Supreme Court will be to focus on the state's selection
of the interest to be protected rather than to fit the acts complained of
into neat formulas of "state action" or "federal right."
William B. Freilich
26. KORNHAUSSR, Tn4 POLITICS Of MASS SOCIXTY 32 (1959). Kornhauser
defines mass society as a "situation in which the aggregate of individuals are related
to one another only by way of their relation to a common authority, especially the
state. That is, individuals are not directly related to one another in a variety of
independent groups. A population in this condition is not insulated in any way from
the ruling group, nor yet from elements within itself."
FALL 1963]
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CRIMINAL LAW-INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER- PARTICIPANTS IN
RUSSIAN ROULETTE GAME CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR DEATH
OF COPARTICIPANT.
Commonwealth v. Atencio (Mass. 1963)
The two defendants and the decedent, after drinking wine for a time,
decided to play "Russian roulette."' Defendant Marshall inserted a cart-
ridge into a revolver, spun the cylinder, pointed the gun to his head, and
pulled the trigger. Nothing happened. He handed the gun to defendant
Atencio who repeated the process with the same result. Atencio passed
the gun to the decedent, who spun it, put it to his head, and pulled the
trigger. The cartridge exploded, fatally wounding him. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction of the defendants for the
crime of involuntary manslaughter, holding that the Commonwealth had
an interest that the decedent should not be killed by the wanton and reck-
less conduct of himself and others. Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.
2d 223 (Mass. 1963).
The defendants could be convicted for the homicide in the instant
case on either of two theories. The first theory is that the defendants'
acts caused the death. The second is that the killing of the decedent is
imputed to the defendant.2 The opinion is unclear as to which theory
applied.
Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional non-malicious killing
of another which results from wanton and reckless conduct of the defendant.8
As defendants' conduct must be the proximate cause of death, the first
inquiry into the decision of the instant case is to determine whether the
defendants' acts could be said to be proximate. The recent case of Com-
monwealth v. Root 4 presented issues similar to those in Atencio. In Root,
the decedent and the defendant were participants in a drag race. Decedent
passed the defendant on a curve, collided with an oncoming truck and was
killed. The court held that the causal connection between defendant's
reckless conduct and the death of the decedent was insufficient to sustain
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.5
Although the two cases are analogous in the sense that there was a
challenge to do an illegal act that would endanger the lives of either or
both participants, the court makes the skill in drag racing the controlling
1. "Russian roulette" is a "game" in which each participant spins the chambered
cylinder of a revolver, one of the chambers being loaded, and then points the gun to
his head and pulls the trigger. In a six chambered cylinder the odds are five to one
that he will live.
2. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863).
3. Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass. 489, 55 N.E.2d 913 (1944); Common-
wealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) ; Commonwealth v. Root,
403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
4. Supra, note 3.
5. Contra, State v. Fair, 209 S.C. 439, 40 S.E.2d 634 (1946).
[VOL. 9
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distinction between them. It cannot be denied that Russian roulette is
far more dangerous than drag racing.0 Since the boundary lines of
proximate cause are governed by many considerations, they may, and in
fact do, vary according to the jural consequences of the particular case
involved. 7 Conceivably then, a different set of tests of proximate cause
might be established for each particular crime. It has been said that any
intended consequence of an act is proximate for the following reason: "It
would be plainly absurd that a person should be allowed to act with an
intention to produce a certain consequence, and then when that very
consequence in fact follows his act, to escape liability for it on the plea
that it was not proximate." s The line of demarcation between causes which
will be recognized as proximate and those which will be recognized as
remote "is really a very flexible line."9 Thus, the Massachusetts Court,
in holding that defendants' acts proximately caused decedent's death, in
effect said that because "Russian roulette" is more dangerous than drag
racing, the limitations of proximate cause are broader, as public policy
requires. Although such a distinction is valid, it should be understood
that it is based on policy considerations, not scientific principles.
Also analogous to Atencio is Commonwealth v. Bolish,10 where de-
fendant and deceased planned to set a building on fire to collect insurance.
The decedent entered the building and spread kerosene near a h6t plate,
causing an unexpected explosion which inflicted him with fatal burns.
Defendant was indicted for murder and convicted under the felony-murder
doctrine. The trial judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's action was the proxi-
mate cause of the killing. However, if the victim's own, willing, under-
standing action superseded all other causes in the chain of events as the
substantial factor causing his own death, they would have to acquit the
defendant. Rather than declare the defendant's acts were, as a matter of
6. The Atencio court said, "There is a very real distinction between drag racing
and 'Russian roulette.' In the former much is left to the skill, or lack of it, of the
competitor. In 'Russian roulette' it is a matter of luck as to the location of one bullet,
and except for a misfire . . . the outcome is a certainty if the chamber under the
hammer happens to be the one containing the bullet." By this the court meant that
when a person engages in Russian roulette the trigger is, in effect, pulled for him.
In drag racing the situation is not the same. If the participant drives poorly there
is the chance of a fatal injury but if he drives in an expert manner the chance of a
fatal injury is small. In Russian roulette the participant does not have a choice nor
can he, in anyway, direct the outcome.
7. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES or LEGAL SCIENcE 83 (1928).
8. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. R.v. 343, 358 (1924) ; Terry, Proximate
Consequence in the Law of Torts, 28 HARV. L. Rxv. 10, 17 (1914).
9. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS or LEGAL LIABILITY 111 (1906); See generally,
GREEN, RATIONALE OP PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Beale, The Proximate Conse-
quences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. Rev. 633 (1920); Carpenter, Workable Rules for
Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALI. L. Rgv. 229, 396, 471 (1932); James &
Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39
HARV. L. Rev. 149 (1925); Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALn. L.
Rv. 369 (1950) ; Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. Rlv. 103, 223,
303 (1911).
10. 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955), affirmance upheld on rehearing, 391 Pa.
550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958).
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law, proximate, the court submitted the question to the jury which readily
could have found that decedent's acts caused his own death independent
of the defendant's acts." Such a procedure was entirely correct.' 2
Justice Musmanno vigorously dissented in the Bolish case. Although
his views appear meritorious, one can discern that they have been fostered
due to an unsatisfactory disposition of the case, rather than through pro-
cedural error. 13 Others have disagreed with Bolish. They point out that
what is imputed to the felon through the felony-murder fiction is malice,
not the act of killing. However, the majority correctly decided this prob-
lem by saying, in effect, that if the jury found that defendant killed the
cofelon, then malice would be implied.
Comparing Bolish with Atencio, one can see very little, if any, signi-
ficant difference in the proximity between defendants' conduct and the
deaths. In Bolish, the defendant set the stage by procuring the kerosene
and flammable material and by driving the decedent to the house; in
Atencio defendants set the stage by procuring the gun and by playing the
game. In the Bolish case, notwithstanding the claim of the defense that
the decedent's acts were a supervening cause of the death, the jury could
and did find that the defendant's acts were the indirect, but yet proximate,
cause of the death. The jury in Atencio could have found that the defend-
ants' acts were proximate in that they gave impetus to the game and
engendered circumstances where decedent's acts were a natural reaction to
the stimulus of the situation. In that respect, the victim's acts were a de-
pendent intervening cause. Moreover, the jury could have decided that this
dependent intervening cause was not superseding so as to terminate defend-
ants' liability, either because they thought the victim's response was normal
or because they thought that under the circumstances, it was foreseeable.
It is frustrating to attempt to rationalize the cases of Bolish and Atencio
to determine their validity, because the point at which proximate cause
becomes remote is essentially a matter of opinion. In criminal law, such
an opinion is influenced by many intangibles, including the judge's philos-
ophy of punishment and his view of the limits of the court's role in
developing and expanding the criminal law.
A person may also be found guilty of homicide because the killing is
imputed to him. One who joins in a common design to commit an unlaw-
ful act involving danger to life is responsible for a death committed in the
furtherance of the design, although he was not the actual perpetrator, and
the plan did not involve the taking of life. 14 A person who joins in such an
11. Contra, People v. LaBarbera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.S. 257 (1936);
Compare, People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928), where the court
missed the point entirely by overlooking the problem of causation.
12. See HoLMts, THE COMMON LAW 56 (1923).
13. Mr. Justice Musmanno dissented for two reasons. First, he argued that the
majority did not construe the felony-murder statute correctly; secondly, he thought
the decedent's death was accidental. "His [decedent's] death was an accident. No
one attempted to shoot him, no one tried to poison him, no one sought to explode
him." 391 Pa. 550, 559, 138 A.2d 447, 451 (1958).
14. State v. Scott, 80 Conn. 317, 323, 68 At. 258, 260 (1907).
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unlawful act is either a principal in the first degree, a principal in the second
degree, or an accessory before or after the fact.15 As the defendants in
Atencio were present when the gun was discharged, there is no possibility
of their being accessories. Moreover, because deceased was not an inno-
cent agent of the defendants and assuming the court had found the de-
fendants' acts were not the proximate cause of the death, the defendants
are not principals in the first degree. The remaining possibilities are that
deceased killed himself either intentionally or accidentally. Had deceased
killed himself intentionally, he would have been guilty of suicide in juris-
dictions where there is such a crime. 16 However, in the instant case, it is
clear from the nature of the game that deceased did not intend to kill
himself. Consequently, one must conclude that deceased accidentally killed
himself, and the death resulted from his own criminal negligence. Although
one who negligently causes his own death is guilty of no crime, the ultimate
question in resolving this issue is whether defendants can be held as prin-
cipals in the second degree to an act that does not exist in law as a crime.
Until the decision in R. v. Bourne,17 the answer would undoubtedly
have been in the negative, but that case compels a closer examination of
the problem. Having forced his wife to commit an unnatural act with an
animal, defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting his wife to commit
buggery. The defendant contended that because his wife could not be
found guilty of buggery, having been forced to commit the act, he could
not be guilty as a principal in the second degree since there was no crime
committed by the wife. The Court of Criminal Appeals affiirmed the con-
viction, stating that the defense of duress "admits that she committed the
crime but prays to be excused from punishment by reason of duress. . ...18
This reasoning is difficult to accept. Duress is more than a request for
relief from punishment; it is a legal defense, and if established, the person
is acquitted because he did not have the requisite mens rca.19 If there is
no mens rea, there is no crime. The finding of a crime where the actus reus
was committed without mens rea is unprecedented in criminal law in an
offense of this nature. That a coconspirator or principal in the second
degree is guilty of a crime is founded in the theory that the crime committed
15. State v. Powell, 168 N.C. 134, 138, 83 S.E. 310, 313 (1914) ; PERKINS, CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 8 (1957). A principal in the first degree is one who either is the actual per-
petrator or who acts through an innocent agent. See Beausoliel v. United States,
107 F.2d 292, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; In re Vann, 136 Fla. 113, 118, 186 So. 424, 426(1939). A principal in the second degree is one who aids and abets a person in the
commission of a crime. See Beausoliel v. United States, supra. Accessories before
or after the fact are those who are not present when the act takes place. See Duke
v. State, 137 Fla. 513, 188 So. 124 (1939); Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302
Mass. 349, 19 N.E.2d 62 (1939) ; State v. Fame, 190 S.C. 75, 1 S.E.2d 912 (1939).
16. Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala. App. 207, 194 So. 421 (1940);
Borrson v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 351 Mo. 229, 172 S.W.2d 835 (1943).
17. [1952] 36 Crim. App. R. 125.
18. Id. at 128.
19. Tomoya Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 72 S.Ct. 950 (1952);
Perryman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388 (1940) ; People v. Jackerson, 247
N.Y. 36, 159 N.E. 715 (1928).
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